## Increasing Architectural Resilience to Small Delay Faults

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## **DelayAVF Overview**



Recent findings point to **small delay faults** caused by marginal chip defects as an emergent reason for failures at scale.




Our current ability to reason about small delay faults is limited as vulnerability estimation work **primarily focuses on particle strikes.** 




Our Contribution: DelayAVF

A methodology to assess vulnerability to small delay faults, demonstrating actionable chip-level insights.

### **CPUs can have defects, resulting in Silent Data Corruptions (SDCs)!**



SDCs can result in silently incorrect outputs, often only realized much later in the execution!



### Silent data corruptions already inhibit at-scale workloads

#### SDCs are pervasive in High Performance Computing...

In High-End Computing clusters, the time spent recovering from SDCs can exceed 65% of all computation [1]!

#### 168-HOUR JOB, 5 YEAR MTBF

# Nodes	work	checkpt	recomp.	restart
100	96%	1%	3%	0%
1,000	92%	7%	1%	0%
10,000	75%	15%	6%	4%
100,000	35%	20%	10%	35%


And in ML workloads, where correctness is often hard to determine!

ML training and inference at scale can often be stymied by SDCs, leading to poor accuracy and NaN results [2].


[1] Fiala et al.; Detection and Correction of Silent Data Corruption for Large-Scale High-Performance Computing; SC12
[2] Elsen et al.; The Adventure of the Errant Hardware; <u>http://adept.ai/blog/sherlock-sdc</u>


## We can naïvely increase the reliability of chips using redundancy

- One strategy to improve reliability is redundancy via duplication.
- Naïve Idea: Three copies of the chip vote on the correct solution.
- Problem: It's not feasible to duplicate/triplicate the chip!



## Not every bit-flip will result in a deviation from the program's expected output





## Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) [1]



How can we identify structures particularly vulnerable to **particle strikes**?

We can quantify a structure's Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF):


What fraction of time will a bit-flip in that structure result in architecturally incorrect execution?




Key Benefit: We can acquire reliability insights early in the design process.

## Environmental, aging, and manufacturing conditions can cause chip failure


#### Errors can occur due to....





## Delay faults have emerged as an important fault mode

- Recent findings [1,2,3] point to marginal defects as an emergent reason for chip failures.
- A delay induced on a circuit element's signal may result in a setup violation, resulting in an error.



<sup>[1]</sup> https://semiengineering.com/screening-for-silent-data-errors/

<sup>[2]</sup> https://www.sigarch.org/silent-data-corruption-at-scale/


<sup>[3]</sup> Singh et al.; Silent Data Errors: Sources, Detection, and Modeling; VTS '23

## Using AVF to study delay faults is challenging



**Goal**: We want to utilize AVF to reason about small delay fault models, but there are **key differences** to prior work...


## **Challenge 1: The point of fault is no longer the point of error**





We cannot reason about vulnerability to small delay faults by solely examining state elements!


## Challenge 2: Delay faults can result in multiple *simultaneous* bit flips





We need to reason about errors that occur simultaneously, potentially interacting with each other!

**DelayAVF's Key Idea**: Reason about the vulnerability of the structure's <u>circuit elements</u> (e.g., wires or gates) rather than state elements.



**Our Contribution: An Architectural Vulnerability Factor for Small Delay Faults** 

#### We provide a methodology to derive and compute *DelayAVF*

#### **DelayAVF:**

The probability that a delay fault in a microarchitectural structure propagates to a program-visible error.

#### Deriving DelayAVF via studying the vulnerability of individual circuit elements

#### We reason about the impact of a fault through the lens of the affected element

Delay	A circuit element <i>e</i> is <i>delayACE</i> in cycle <i>i</i> if a fixed-length delay <i>d</i> results in a program-visible
ACEness	error.


#### The DelayAVF of a structure can be formulated in terms of the ACEness of its elements

DelayAVF of a Structure	$DelayAVF(H) = \sum_{\forall e \in C} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{isDelayACE(e, i)}{N \cdot  C }$		
	-) - -	This formulation enables us to tractably compute DelayAVF early in the design stage.	

# DelayAVF's Insights on a RISC-V Core


## **Q1:** Is DelayAVF useful in guiding placement of mitigations? Yes!

Normalized DelayAVF Values for Varying Structures and Delay Durations



DelayAVF reveals that different microarchitectural structures can have significantly different vulnerabilities to small delay faults!

### Q2: Could we just use particle-strike AVF? No, it leads to different rankings!




#### Comparison of Normalized DelayAVF and AVF Values

High vulnerability to particle strikes does not imply a high vulnerability to small delay faults (and vice-versa).

#### Q3: Is Static Timing Analysis Sufficient to Reason About Delay Vulnerability? No!


ALU DelayAVF for Different Benchmarks in Beebs Suite



Both program and architectural-level effects can influence vulnerability to delay faults.

#### Summary: A Methodology to Architecturally Reason About Small Delay Faults

- Small delay faults appear to be a driving factor of silent data corruptions experienced by cloud providers.
- This work: We developed a DelayAVF, a methodology to target expensive chip-level mitigations towards small delay faults, by quantifying a structure's vulnerability.



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Questions/Comments?

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